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### 1AC

A diferentes países los

Certifican los gringos

No quieren que exista droga

Pues dicen que es un peligro

¿Díganme quien certifica

A los Estados Unidos?

Para agarrar a los narcos

México a sido derecho.

Los gringos compran la coca

La pagan a cualquier precio.

No quieren que exista droga

Pero se dan privilegios

Different countries are

Certified by the gringos

They do not want drugs there

For they say that is a danger

Tell me who certifies

The United States?

To catch the narcos

Mexico has been straight.

The Americans buy coke

They pay it at any price.

They do not want drugs to exist

But give themselves privileges.

(from “El General” by Los Tigres del Norte, translation in “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos” by Alejandro Lajous)

#### US attitude toward drugs is captured here by Los Tigres del Norte. Foreign supply is a threat, but domestic demand is a lost cause; while little is done to curtail consumption, the centerpiece of US engagement toward Mexico is characterized by militarized surveillance and violent suppression to combat drug trafficking. Any deviance from the status quo is perceived as a threat – the only option is the perpetuation of Calderon’s “war”

Freidersdorf, 13

staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs (Conor, “Mexico Is Ready to End Failed Drug-War Policies—Why Isn't the U.S.?,” The Atlantic, 30 April 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/mexico-is-ready-to-end-failed-drug-war-policies-why-isnt-the-us/275410/)//bghs-BI>

Did you know that the U.S. has been operating surveillance drones in Mexico, providing air support for the Mexican military, tracking the movements of Mexican citizens, sharing state-of-the-art spy technology with Mexican officials, and sending CIA agents to help Mexico train drug informants? Did you know the DEA has more employees stationed in Mexico than any of its other foreign posts? That Mexican nationals trained and bankrolled by the CIA raid Mexican drug cartels? Or that the CIA runs high-tech "fusion centers" in Mexico City, Monterrey and elsewhere? "For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have put aside their tension-filled history on security matters to forge an unparalleled alliance against Mexico's drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning," Dana Priest reports in the Washington Post. "But now, much of that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy." Enrique Pena Nieto, Mexico's new leader, reportedly dislikes the status quo, and was shocked, on taking office this December, at the degree of United States involvement in his country. The article is worth reading in full. What I can't help but remark upon is the way that it handles the spectacular failure of the War on Drugs. It notes "mounting criticism" that any success fighting cartel leaders has also helped to incite "more violence than anyone had predicted, more than 60,000 deaths and 25,000 disappearances in the past seven years alone." Put another way, the period of maximum American involvement has coincided with a horrific spike in drug-related violence. "Meanwhile," Priest continues, "the drug flow into the United States continued unabated. Mexico remains the U.S. market's largest supplier of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine and the transshipment point for 95 percent of its cocaine." So the strategy was high cost, low reward. It increased violence and did nothing to reduce the drug supply. Yet the fact that it completely failed plays basically no role in the rest of the article, in large part because everyone in the United States government apparently wants to preserve the failed status quo. American officials are very upset that Mexico's new leader has decided to go his own way. Look at the very next sentences: No one had come up with a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support. But stopping the cartel violence had become Peña Nieto's top priority during the campaign. The U.S. administration didn't know what that meant. Some feared a scaling back of the bilateral efforts and a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets. Does anyone else think that "a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets" just might be "a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support"? At the very least, it surely it doesn't make sense to presume, as the article seems to, that the obviously failed status quo is the most "realistic" way forward. Sticking with it is arguably delusional. But that angle is seemingly never pursued. As ever, the utter failure of American drug policy is taken by the establishment as evidence that persisting is of even more importance. The policies the United States pursued in Mexico as part of our increased role there coincided with a huge uptick in violence and no reduction in the supply of Mexican drugs? By God, let's hope that the Mexicans don't decide to try something completely different! It's the most irrational status-quo bias you're likely to find. Given that Mexicans are the ones dealing with the dead bodies in the current arrangement, little wonder that they're able to appreciate the irrationality more than America's mystifyingly persistent drug warriors. Drugs can have awful affects all on their own. What's even worse are black markets in drugs. There's only one way to end them in a free country. And policymakers aren't open to it, despite the fact that ending prohibition would weaken the cartels more than anything. So the carnage continues.

#### Since the 70s, the “war on drugs” has proven a failed initiative, yet it endures; the US-Mexico border has developed into a space of exception where law is suspended by the sovereign

Parker, 11 – master’s degree in cultural and political studies from Royal Holloway, University of London, written extensively in the academic arena on geopolitics, ‘radical’ politics and protest, and mass media (Lindsay, “The Making of a Space of Exception: the War on Drugs, Agamben, and Ciudad

Juarez,” Cultural Geography, August 2011, http://lindsayparkerdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/the-making-of-a-space-of-exception.pdf)//bghs-BI

The “war on drugs” was introduced into the American lexicon by Richard Nixon in 1971 (Cockburn & St. Clair 1998) as a continuation of the prohibitionist drug laws originating from 1914’s Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. The “war on drugs” was simultaneously enforced with Nixon’s “war on crime” that both emphasized “radical turn[s] from welfarist criminal justice approaches emphasizing rehabilitation and redistribution, towards coercive penal governance” (Corva 2008:178). Whereas a welfarist order understood illicit behaviour as symptomatic of an unjust socio-economic society and tried to rehabilitate users, the penal state adopted strict rules that would place offenders in prison for even small amounts of possession (Beckett & Sassoon 2000). Currently this “zero tolerance” policy emphasizes prohibition, halting production, distribution, and the consumption of drugs at the cost of $15 billion annually to the federal government, with state and local governments spending another $25 billion in 2010 alone (Office of National Drug Control Policy 2010). Yet the response nationally and internationally from civilians, lawyers, medical professionals, academics, and police enforcement alike is that the “war on drugs” is an overwhelming failure that has not reduced drug use, drug trafficking, or violent crime, but that has rather resulted in the growth of a multi-billion annual black market that promotes violence and results in harmful repercussions to society (Baum 1996; Bertram 1996). A major source of this violence stems from rival drug cartels throughout Central and South America fighting for trade routes and access to portals along the US/Mexican border across which they can smuggle narcotics for US consumption. The passing of NAFTA in 1994 made trafficking easier and more efficient than ever before (Andreas 1995; Campbell 2009) resulting in the competition for domination of border towns and cities, such as Ciudad Juarez, positioned a mere two miles away from the American border. This strategic location is crucial because of the United States’ insatiable demand for narcotics, especially cocaine. It is estimated that 80-90% of Central and South American cocaine ends up in the United States making border cities and towns incredibly valuable and vulnerable spaces of violent competition (United Nations 2010). As Mexico and the United States keep battling drug cartels in what seems an impossible war to win, narcotics are illegally exported into the United States where demand is still high. The war on drugs and resulting turf war in Juarez are indicative of a re-configuration of geographies of sovereignty and exceptional space along and beyond the border. Sovereign power is a key theme to Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998). Translated from “Sacred Man, “homo sacer” refers to a bare life that is stripped of all citizens” rights that can be killed by anyone without punishment. Human life becomes politicized as it becomes dominated by the sovereign’s suspension of juridical order allowing for otherwise illegal crimes to become normalized because where there is no law, nothing can be illegal. This state of exception is a “point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence” (1998: 32). This threshold is at the core of what Agamben calls the paradox of sovereignty. If sovereign powers are able to declare spaces of exception or suspend the law, they are effectively placing themselves outside of the law. In his own work Agamben uses the example of Nazi concentration camps to exercise the tangibility and physicality of a space of exception, or where juridical order has been indefinitely suspended by sovereign actors. More recently, Agamben and others have identified Guantanamo Bay as such a space (Butler 2002; Gregory 2006). In these examples the sovereign powers, though acting within or outside of the law, were state actors. Agamben’s reading of sovereignty loosely follows Westphalian tenets including the principle of the sovereignty of states and fundamental right to self-determination, the principle of international law equality between states, and the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state (Lyons & Mastanduno 1995). Traditional theorizations of sovereignty stemmed from Westphalia have increasingly come under scrutiny with some even posing the end of a traditional sovereignty in the political realm (Camilleri & Falk 1992; Hardt & Negri 2000; Ward 2003). These are important in considering how ideas of sovereignty have shifted through history and political landscapes including times of civil disobedience, terrorism, war, and globalization, which is especially intertwined (geo)politically and economically with the drug war. The drug war in Juarez is another example that is challenging traditional ideas of how sovereignty is practiced on the ground and how strict binaries of legal and illegal are being nullified and subverted as sovereign state actors are losing power to drug cartels.

#### The war metaphor remains dominant in official discourse surrounding drugs, collapsing the distinction between criminal and enemy – peace is impossible until the enemy is annihilated

Lajous, 12 – doctor of Law at Yale, professor and researcher at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, a Mexican center of research and higher education specialized in social sciences (Alejandro Madrazo, “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos,” translated by Fernanda Alonso)//bghs-BI

III. The criminal and the enemy in the official discourse On December 4th, 2006, just three days after assuming the presidency of the Mexican government, Felipe Calderon announced the first deployment of federal forces, Army included, so as to perform police functions in a state: his native state, Michoacan. "Be assured that my government is working hard to win the war against crime" (Calderón, 2011q). With this, the President defined his crime fighting strategy as a war; he justified the move on the fact that the number of drug-related killings in the region during the previous year exceeded 500.10 A few weeks later, on January 22, 2007, at the XXI Session of the National Security Council, the President went further: "To win the war against crime it is essential that we work together beyond our differences [...] beyond any political party’s flag and any private interest." (Calderon, 2007n) He presented the war as a reason to demand national unity in a country deeply divided by party likes and dislikes, after a competed and questioned election. Infancy is destiny; the use of war metaphors marked the official narrative surrounding crime and security throughout the his administration. Since then, the government does not pursue common criminals in the fulfillment of police functions or law enforcement, but instead confronts them in a war, for which there will be no truce until the enemy is defeated. The war jargon in the war on drugs has dominated the narrative, the political imaginary and the current government policy. The war metaphor in the government’s discourse has obvious practical and strategic functions. On the one hand, "(...) it is applied to keep justifying the use of the Armed Forces..." (Miguel Lopez Norzagaray David 2010; 172), one of the building blocks of the security policy for the administration. On the other hand, it functions as a rhetorical framework to call for national unity. However, it also has consequences that go beyond those that it seemingly seeks. On the one hand, it builds up crime and on the other it blurs the boundaries between different categories within the law. The government does not prosecute people who commit different types of crimes –kidnapping, drug trafficking, and murder– but crime itself. In this sense, "(...) drug trafficking was framed within a larger enemy, an enemy that is even more sparse than the very same drug trafficking, one ranging from common crime to the organized social structure needed to commit a crime." (Norzagaray Lopez 2010; 229) This section looks to explore how, in the official discourse dominated by the war metaphor, the distinction between criminal and enemy collapses. By labeling delinquents as enemies, President Calderon is not only establishing an identity between the terms, but also establishing in the political imaginary, on which he reflects and builds his discourse, that the criminal fulfills the function of the enemy (and not only shares his label).11

#### Politicizing the criminal as the enemy subjects them not to law but unlimited sovereignty, enabling the state to justify sacrifice of the political community and making civil war inevitable

Lajous, 12 – doctor of Law at Yale, professor and researcher at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, a Mexican center of research and higher education specialized in social sciences (Alejandro Madrazo, “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos,” translated by Fernanda Alonso)//bghs-BI

II. The criminal and the enemy in the political imaginary8 The temptation to label a criminal as an enemy and point him out as "public enemy number 1”, is enormous, especially when the threat he represents is perceived as overwhelming. But the distinction between a criminal and an enemy in the political imaginary is crucial: it reflects and supports the distinction between sovereignty and law, between political action –in its strictest sense— and legal action. Criminals and enemies may do the same violent acts, destroying property and persons. Nevertheless, the modern political imaginary carefully maintained the distinction as a matter of both formal law and informal representation. (Kahn, 2010; 1) In the modern political imaginary, the criminal and the enemy occupy different spaces: the criminal faces the law; the enemy faces sovereignty. Law is restricted, predetermined, it cannot overturn the rules that it is made up of; sovereignty is unlimited, unrestricted, subject only to its ability to affirm itself. The criminal is not the enemy; the enemy is not the criminal. The enemy can be killed but not punished. (…) On the other hand, the criminal can be punished but, in most of the West, he cannot be killed. (Kahn, 2010; 1)9 The distinction lies precisely on the difference between the criminal’s relationship to law and the enemy’s relationship to sovereignty. The criminal is a citizen, a part of the political community, and therefore enjoys the protection of the very laws which he infringes; the enemy is the opposite of a citizen, located outside the political community and posing a threat to it; consequently the enemy does not enjoy the protection of the law, nor is he under obligation to abide by it. Moreover, the enemy has the right to resist the violence of a political community to which he does not belong to; the criminal does not. Informally, warfare is imagined as a sort of duel: a reciprocal relationship of threat, of killing and being killed. (…) This is why every war is imagined as “self-defense” by both sides of the conflict. The confrontation with the criminal, on the other hand, is certainly not imagined as a duel. Criminals have no right of self-defense against the police. The force of law is asymmetrical. For this reason, we think of the violence of law – policing – as “depoliticized.” There is a corresponding depoliticalization of the violence of crime: it is not political threat, but personal pathology. Law enforcement aims to prevent the violence of the criminal from becoming a source of collective self-expression. Were it to become so, we would confront an enemy. (Kahn, 2010; 2) The law in a political community says nothing to its enemies, nor does it say anything about its enemies. The enemy does not operate in the restricted field of law, operating instead in the unrestricted space of sovereignty. Contrastingly, the criminal is determined by the law he infringes: Everything about the criminal is defined by law, from the elements of the crime, to the procedure of adjudication, to the character of punishment. His depoliticalization is accomplished through his complete juridification. The law, however, will not tell us who are our enemies. It will not define the conditions of victory or defeat. It will not tell us how seriously to take a threat or how devastating to make the response. The enemy, despite the efforts of international law, is not a juridical figure at all. (Kahn, 2010; 2) The enemy is located outside the political community and threatens it. Because of this, the enemy endows members of the community with an identity: they are ultimately identified in contrast to the person who is not a member of the political community: the enemy (who is in turn, identified in contrast to the first). The criminal does not fulfill that role in the political imaginary. His existence does not identify us, and he does not identify himself as opposed to the political community, but rather he participates in it. True, he participates from a marginal and stigmatized position, but he is part of the community that punishes him. Against the enemy, the state may legitimately require sacrifices from us –including our lives— so as to protect the continuity of the political community. Against the criminal, we require the State’s protection, not vice versa. We are presented then, with two very different categories, which must not be confused. The criminal is a member of the political community; the enemy is not. The criminal is subject to the law of the community and is simultaneously protected and bound by it; the enemy is not. The criminal should be punished; the enemy destroyed or subdued. The criminal is completely juridified (he is regulated and precisely constraint by the law) and, therefore, depoliticized; the enemy is necessarily a politicized subject (he defines the polis by opposing it) and cannot be understood through the law. But the distinction between criminal and enemy is not only important to them; the distinction is fundamental –foundational even– to the political community, i.e. to "us", all individuals belonging to it: At stake in the criminal/enemy distinction, I will argue, is the relationship of sovereignty to law. These are not just categories of theory, but the organizing principles of political and personal narrative. When we lose control of the categories, we can lose the sense of who we are. (Kahn, 2010; If we collapse the two categories, we lose our political identity. We no longer know who belongs to the "us" (the political community, which in principle, includes criminals) and who belongs to the "they" (the enemies). When the criminal becomes an enemy, the community’s action is no longer the application of law, but that of a civil war: Indeed, under some circumstances criminals do become enemies: the order of law becomes the disorder of civil war. (Kahn, 2010; 5) When the criminal is politicized, he is mistaken for the enemy; he becomes the enemy. He is no longer identified by the law (which signals him as an offender), but instead he is identified as that which opposes sovereignty, that is the political community; against which he is now "entitled" to confront. The community can no longer demand obedience from him. He goes from being in an asymmetrical relationship governed by the law to a symmetric relation (symbolically) analogous to a duel, in which the law disappears and all that remains is the contrast of two competing wills in the field of sovereignty. That is, in a space in which only a civil war can be deployed, no longer a normative system.

#### The biopolitical determination of the threshold beyond which life ceases to have juridical value creates the category of a “life devoid of value” which spills over to the biological body of every living being and nullifies value to death

Agamben, 98 – professor of philosophy at university of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceprio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### When the legitimacy and existence of a population is in question, politics become murderous – the entirety of the world is reduced to bare life in an attempt to rid the public sphere of all risk. The only option becomes the extermination of all life

Duarte, 5 – professor of Philosophy at Universidade Federal do Paraná (André, “Biopolitics and the dissemination of violence: the Arendtian critique of the present,” April 2005, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=andre\_duarte)//bghs-BI

These historic transformations have not only brought more violence to the core of the political but have also redefined its character by giving rise to biopolitical violence. As stated, what characterizes biopolitics is a dynamic of both protecting and abandoning life through its inclusion and exclusion from the political and economic community. In Arendtian terms, the biopolitical danger is best described as the risk of converting animal laborans into Agamben’s homo sacer, the human being who can be put to death by anyone and whose killing does not imply any crime whatsoever 13).  When politics is conceived of as biopolitics, as the task of increasing the life and happiness of the national *animal laborans*, the nation-state becomes ever more violent and murderous. If we link Arendt’s thesis from *The Human Condition* to those of The Origins of Totalitarianism, we can see the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps as the most refined experiments in annihilating the “bare life” of *animal laborans* (although these are by no means the only instances in which the modern state has devoted itself to human slaughter). Arendt is not concerned only with the process of the extermination itself, but also the historical situation in which large-scale exterminations were made possible – above all, the emergence of ‘uprooted’ and ‘superfluous’ modern masses, what we might describe as *animal laborans* balanced on the knife-edge of ‘bare life.’ Compare her words in ‘Ideology and Terror’ (1953), which became the conclusion of later editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism: Isolation is that impasse into which men [humans] are driven when the political sphere of their lives… is destroyed… Isolated man who lost his place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an *animal laborans* whose necessary ‘metabolism with nature’ is of concern to no one. Isolation then become loneliness… Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all 14). The conversion of homo faber, the human being as creator of durable objects and institutions, into *animal laborans* and, later on, into homo sacer, can be traced in Arendt’s account of nineteenth century imperialism. As argued in the second volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism, European colonialism combined racism and bureaucracy to perpetrate the “most terrible massacres in recent history, the Boers’ extermination of Hottentot tribes, the wild murdering by Carl Peters in German Southeast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful Congo population – from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 million people; and finally, perhaps worst of all, it resulted in the triumphant introduction of such means of pacification into ordinary, respectable foreign policies.” 15)  This simultaneous protection and destruction of life was also at the core of the two World Wars, as well as in many other more local conflicts, during which whole populations have become stateless or deprived of a public realm. In spite of all their political differences, the United States of Roosevelt, the Soviet Russia of Stalin, the Nazi Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini were all conceived of as states devoted to the needs of the national *animal laborans*. According to Agamben, since our contemporary politics recognizes no other value than life, Nazism and fascism, that is, regimes which have taken bare life as their supreme political criterion are bound to remain standing temptations 16).  Finally, it is obvious that this same logic of promoting and annihilating life persists both in post-industrial and in underdeveloped countries, inasmuch as economic growth depends on the increase of unemployment and on many forms of political exclusion. When politics is reduced to the tasks of administering, preserving and promoting the life and happiness of animal laborans it ceases to matter that those objectives require increasingly violent acts, both in national and international arenas. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the legality of state violence has become a secondary aspect in political discussions, since what really matters is to protect and stimulate the life of the national (or, as the case may be, Western) *animal laborans*. In order to maintain sacrosanct ideals of increased mass production and mass consumerism, developed countries ignore the finite character of natural reserves and refuse to sign International Protocols regarding natural resource conservation or pollution reduction, thereby jeopardising future humanity. They also launch preventive attacks and wars, disregard basic human rights, for instance in extra-legal detention camps such as Guantánamo,27)  and multiply refugee camps. Some countries have even imprisoned whole populations, physically isolating them from other communities, in a new form of social, political and economic apartheid. In short, states permit themselves to impose physical and structural violence against individuals and regimes (‘rogue states’ 18) ) that supposedly interfere with the security and growth of their national ‘life process.’ If, according to Arendt, the common world consists of an institutional in-between meant to outlast both human natality and mortality, in modern mass societies we find the progressive abolition of the institutional artifice that separates and protects our world from the forces of nature 19).  This explains the contemporary feeling of disorientation and unhappiness, likewise the political impossibility we find in combining stability and novelty 20).  In the context of a “waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end,” 21)  it is not only possible, but also necessary, that people themselves become raw material to be consumed, discarded, annihilated. In other words, when Arendt announces the “grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption,” 22)  we should also remember that human annihilation, once elevated to the status of an ‘end-in-itself’ in totalitarian regimes, still continues to occur – albeit in different degrees and by different methods, in contemporary ‘holes of oblivion’ such as miserably poor Third World neighbourhoods 23)  and penitentiaries, underpaid and slave labour camps, in the name of protecting the vital interests of *animal laborans*. To talk about a process of human consumption is not to speak metaphorically but literally. Heidegger had realized this in his notes written during the late thirties, later published under the title of Overcoming Metaphysics. He claimed that the difference between war and peace had already been blurred in a society in which “metaphysical man [human], the animal rationale, gets fixed as the labouring animal,” so that “labour is now reaching the metaphysical rank of the unconditional objectification of everything present.” 24)  Heidegger argued that once the world becomes fully determined by the “circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption” it is at the brink of becoming an ‘unworld’ (Unwelt), since ‘man [human], who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into the process. Man is “the most important raw material” because he remains the subject of all consumption.’ 25)  After the Second World War and the release of detailed information concerning the death factories Heidegger took his critique even further, acknowledging that to understand man as both subject and object of the consumption process would still not comprehend the process of deliberate mass extermination. He saw this, instead, in terms of the conversion of man into no more than an “item of the reserve fund for the fabrication of corpses” (Bestandestücke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen). According to Heidegger, what happened in the extermination camps was that death became meaningless, and the existential importance of our anxiety in the face of death was lost; instead, people were robbed of the essential possibility of dying, so that they merely “passed away” in the process of being “inconspicuously liquidated” (unauffällig liquidiert). 26)  The human being as *animal laborans* (Arendt), as homo sacer (Agamben), as an ‘item of the reserve fund’ (Heidegger) – all describe the same process of dehumanisation whereby humankind is reduced to the bare fact of being alive, with no further qualifications. As argued by Agamben, when it becomes impossible to differentiate between biós and zóe, that is, when bare life is transformed into a qualified or specific ‘form of life,’ we face the emergence of a biopolitical epoch 27).  When states promote the animalisation of man by policies that aim at both protecting and destroying human life, we can interpret this in terms of the widespread presence of the homo sacer in our world: “If it is true that the figure proposed by our age is that of an unsacrificeable life that has nevertheless become capable of being killed to an unprecedented degree, then the bare life of homo sacer concerns us in a special way… If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri.” 28) Investigating changes in the way power was conceived of and exercised at the turn of the nineteenth century, Foucault realized that when life turned out to be a constitutive political element, managed, calculated, and normalized by means of biopolitics, political strategies soon became murderous. Paradoxically, when the Sovereign’s prerogative ceased to be simply that of imposing violent death, and became a matter of promoting the growth of life, wars became more and more bloody, mass killing more frequent. Political conflicts now aimed at preserving and intensifying the life of the winners, so that enmity ceased to be political and came to be seen biologically: it is not enough to defeat the enemy; it must be exterminated as a danger to the health of the race, people or community. Thus Foucault on the formation of the modern biopolitical paradigm at the end of the nineteenth century:…death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death… now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life that endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men [humans] to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars have caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end of point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. 29)  Arendt proposed no political utopias, but she remained convinced that our political dilemmas have no necessary outcome, that history has not and will not come to a tragic end. Neither a pessimist nor an optimist, she wanted only to understand the world in which she lived in and to stimulate our thinking and acting in the present. It is always possible that radically new political constellations will come into our world, and responsibility for them will always be ours. If we wish to remain faithful to the spirit of Arendt’s political thinking, then we must think and act politically without constraining our thinking and acting in terms of some pre-defined understanding of what politics ‘is’ or ‘should’ be. In other words, I believe that the political challenge of the present is to multiply the forms, possibilities and spaces in which we can act politically. These may be strategic actions destined to further the agendas of political parties concerned with social justice. They can also be discrete, subversive actions favoured by small groups at the margins of the bureaucratised party machines, promoting political interventions free of particular strategic intentions, since their goal is to invite radical politicisation of existence. Finally, there are also actions in which ethical openness towards otherness becomes political: small and rather inconspicuous actions of acknowledging and welcoming, of extending hospitality and solidarity towards others.

#### In the face of the hegemonic “war” discourse, an alternative has arisen in the public imaginary: the *narcocorrido*. Ambivalent but credible, epic but ordinary, it constitutes rebellion against a political system sustained on exceptionalism

Lajous, 12 – doctor of Law at Yale, professor and researcher at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, a Mexican center of research and higher education specialized in social sciences (Alejandro Madrazo, “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos,” translated by Fernanda Alonso)//bghs-BI

IV. The criminal and the enemy in the saga of the narcocorrido There is popular tradition, deeply rooted in our country, that through various means such as literature, popular press, oral tradition and music, highlights and records the events of criminal’s lives, opposing the official discourse (see eg Speckman, 2002). One of the best-known means that materialize this tradition is the popular music genre known as the corrido, popular music relating noteworthy events and the daily life of communities. Specifically, the narcocorrido, presents itself as a contemporary successor or subgenre of the corrido. The narcocorrido is of interest here because it offers an alternative view to the official stance on drug trafficking in our country. Faced with a hegemonic official discourse on drug trafficking, popular culture, and on occasions the drug traffickers themselves,13 offer their vision of the phenomenon, through narcocorridos. Luis Astorga points out that some narcocorridos are spontaneous products of popular culture, while others are deliberately sponsored by drug traffickers themselves to build their own image. The two variants break the state monopoly ub geberatubg of the discourse referring to drug trafficking (Astorga, 1997). With the dawn of the narcocorridos, "the identity of the group was no longer subject to the will, imaginary and interest of those who had hitherto managed to impose their classifications, and turn them into official discourse" (Astorga, 1997, 2). Astorga argues that the stories told in the narcocorridos focus on presenting facts, rather than justifying them: "There is no justification for their activities, only an affirmation of situations where the primacy of the ethical codes and rules of the game at play are often disputed through gun shots" (Astorga, 1997, 10-1). The stories reflected in the narcocorridos are in fact ambivalent: torn between telling the facts and even criticizing them, or praising and vindicating the protagonists. For some, the narcocorridos tend more towards the second pole of this spectrum (Benavides et al., 2009, 152). Regardless of whether the stories told in the narcocorridos are understood as "documentation" of the popular interpretation of the facts or as a ladatio of the patrons of the musicians who compose them, the truth is that in recounting the events from the perspective of those living surrounded by drug trafficking and its profits, narcocorridos express cultural counter-values to the official discourse and culture. The narcocorrido is presented as the popular voice that contrasts with the discourse of political power; at least that is what it intends (Lara, 2003) (Wald, 2008). This is not to say that the narcocorrido (fully) articulates a political or ethical discourse, but rather it outlines one, providing an epic, but not enough to articulate an ethic14. It is the epic that is offered by the narcocorrido what perhaps allows us a glimpse into the roles of the criminal, authority, the law and the enemy in the popular imaginary of communities living near or in contact with drug-related business and its prohibition. Both the corrido and the narcocorrido deal with the heroic deeds of cultural heroes or individuals who are considered to be exceptional or considered to have done exceptional deeds, usually with great bravery and courage in the face of danger: soldiers and revolutionary leaders in the early twentieth century; drug traffickers and smugglers at the end of the same century. One of the main functions that wields the corrido and which made it so popular during the twentieth century, was the broadcasting of events that occurred during the period of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, which were very difficult to transmit from mass media such as newspapers ... for the majority of the population that was submerged in appalling illiteracy ... there was no point in disseminating the news in print ... the corrido (...) has definitely served as an important form in broadcasting, that brings us closer to life in the communities ... [In the corridos,] the Mexican masses have seen their desires, passions, frustrations and sympathies reflected. (Lara, 2003; 213) "The history of the narcocorrido goes all the way back to the corridos of border smugglers in the nineteenth century. In those years it was not marijuana, cocaine or heroin that was being smuggled, but fabrics, spices and clothing, among other goods. The flow of contraband also wasn’t like it is today, from south to north, but rather the opposite; goods were transported from the U.S. to Mexico." (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; 22) Alcohol prohibition, established in 1920 in the United States, led to the creation of a smuggling business from Canada and Mexico. For Mexican bootleggers, alcohol smuggling was a task that: "Was extremely dangerous and difficult, as the smugglers sometimes had to travel hundreds of miles trying to bring the cargo to its destination, whilst confusing the hated rinches, the Texas Rangers, who were in charge, along with federal agencies, of combating them. (...) It is in this context that the most important precursor of drug trafficking corridos is produced in the nineteen twenties and early thirties… the corridos about tequila smugglers. " (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011, 35-36) From the origins of the smuggler’s corrido15, an important feature for understanding the relationships between traffickers and officials can be identified: "(...) we have found several notions that are still paradigmatic in the current narcocorrido. Namely, we found a strong collusion and transposition between drug dealer, police officer and politician. In other words, we have politicians and police who are traffickers or are protecting traffickers." (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; 68) Specifically, in its origins, the smuggler’s corrido identifies the foreign U.S. authority, or the national authority subdued to it, as threats to the protagonist: "(...) virtually no one in the corridística community would object to representing the American Rangers (be they soldiers, customs police or border patrol agents) in a negative fashion. The Anglo-Saxon with power over the Mexican community (or the Mexican under the services of Anglo- Saxon law) is a target accepted by this community, which perceives itself as victimized." (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; 35) In addition to identifying the U.S. authority as the threat to the smuggler (or the Mexican authority under the US authority), the smuggler’s corrido outlines another feature imputed to authority figures: their corruption and, consequently, their participation (usually subordinate) in crime. One of the most famous examples of this type of ballad is the 'Corrido de Mier', also known as 'The Mier customs' and 'The Ward' (...) [what is] narrated makes it clear from the first verses how incredible it is that they managed to mock the entire guard, i.e. all the employees of the customs office, opening the possibility that customs play the part of accomplices rather than smugglers’ incompetent enemies.16 With the narcocorrido, as a subgenre distinguished from the general corrido and as its closest ancestor, the corrido that specifically addresses contraband, grows the propensity to move from a mere chronicle of events or deeds to the elation of heroic deeds (not necessarily an epistle) of the protagonists of the events: This new type of corrido approves and praises those outside the law. It celebrates the heroism of those who are able to pass to the world of crime. In general, the narcocorridos are chronicles of adventure, betrayal, misfortune, love and other acts of individuals involved in the "business", another of the many synonyms of drug trafficking. Be it either through the common language or through key words and phrases, a partial, but credible vision of what drug trafficking is, is being embodied. Some corridos deal with the origins of the drug dealer, and others express the economic causes that push the ordinary Mexican to become a drug dealer. (Massard, 2005) The vision they provide is a criticism to the general context in which the adventure of the drug dealer comes to be, and therefore, it diverges from the official discourse. In speaking of criminals, of the poverty from which they escape, of the crimes and acts corruption, a vision is reflected which cannot but constitute itself as a critique of the world reflected in the official discourse. The narcocorrido reflects the economic crisis and the gradual decline of the system inherited from the Revolution. If it is true that the land reform returned the land to the peasants, today the small farmer has no way out and prefers to replace corn with marijuana, evidently increasing the value of land cultivated and the crop itself. Sociologists agree that narcocorridos represent a sample of the rebellion against a political system that not only fails to provides outputs, but has made corruption and impunity the pillars of its survival, since the tentacles of the drug trafficking have reached the echelons of power... (Massard, 2005) What do the narcocorridos say? What do they tell us about the place that drug traffickers, as criminals, play in the popular political imaginary? Do we see a politicization of the drug trafficker, which corresponds to his politicization in official discourse of the war on drugs?

#### Representations and exposition are the organizing principles behind the debate which we can challenge to alter power

Agamben, 2000 – professor of philosophy at the College International de Philosophie in Paris (Giorgio, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, p. 93-95)

Exposition is the location of politics. If there is no ani­mal politics, that is perhaps because animals are always already in the open and do not try to take possession of their own exposition; they simply live in it without car­ing about it. That is why they are not interested in mir­rors, in the image as image. Human beings, on the other hand, separate images from things and give them a name precisely because they want to recognize themselves, that is, they want to take possession of their own very ap­pearance. Human beings thus transform the open into a world, that is, into the battlefield of a political struggle without quarter. This struggle, whose object is truth, goes by the name of History. It is happening more and more often that in porno­graphic photographs the portrayed subjects, by a calcu­lated stratagem, look into the camera, thereby exhibiting the awareness of being exposed to the gaze. This unex­pected gesture violently belies the fiction that is implicit in the consumption of such images, according to which the one who looks surprises the actors while remaining unseen by them: the latter, rather, knowingly challenge the voyeur’s gaze and force him to look them in the eyes. In that precise moment, the insubstantial nature of the human face suddenly comes to light. The fact that the actors look into the camera means that they show that they are simulating; nevertheless, they paradoxically ap­pear more real precisely to the extent to which they ex­hibit this falsification. The same procedure is used to­day in advertising: the image appears more convincing if it shows openly its own artifice. In both cases, the one who looks is confronted with something that concerns unequivocally the essence of the face, the very structure of truth. We may call tragicomedy of appearance the fact that the face uncovers only and precisely inasmuch as it hides, and hides to the extent to which it uncovers. In this way, the appearance that ought to have manifested human be­ings becomes for them instead a resemblance that be­trays them and in which they can no longer recognize themselves. Precisely because the face is solely the loca­tion of truth, it is also and immediately the location of simulation and of an irreducible impropriety. This does not mean, however, that appearance dissimulares what it uncovers by making it look like what in reality it is not: rather, what human beings truly are is nothing other than this dissimulation and this disquietude within the appearance. Because human beings neither are nor have to be any essence, any nature, or any specific destiny, their condition is the most empty and the most insubstantial of all: it is the truth. What remains hidden from them is not something behind appearance, but rather appearing itself, that is, their being nothing other than a face. The task of politics is to return appearance itself to appearance, to cause appearance itself to appear. The face, truth, and exposition are today the objects of a global civil war, whose battlefield is social life in its en­tirety, whose storm troopers are the media, whose victims are all the peoples of the Earth. Politicians, the media establishment, and the advertising industry have under­stood the insubstantial character of the face and of the community it opens up, and thus they transform it into a miserable secret that they must make sure to control at all costs. State power today is no longer founded on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence — a mo­nopoly that states share increasingly willingly with other nonsovereign organizations such as the United Nations and terrorist organizations; rather, it is founded above all on the control of appearance (of doxa). The fact that politics constitutes itself as an autonomous sphere goes hand in hand with the separation of the face in the world of spectacle — a world in which human communication is being separated from itself. Exposition thus transforms itself into a value that is accumulated in images and in the media, while a new class of bureaucrats jealously watches over its management.

#### **Our affirmation is a form of play that liberates debate from rigid rules and detaches humanity from the sacred**

Dragona, 8 – PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Communication and Mass Media at University Of Athens, Freelance media arts curator (Daphne, “WhoDaresToDe-sacraliseTodaySPlay,” Personal Cinema, Page Last Modified 24 April 2008, http://www.personalcinema.org/warport/index.php?n=Main.WhoDaresToDe-sacraliseTodaySPlay?)

Giorgio Agamben considers play a most important element in culture, explaining that it is the only one that can profane what is considered sacred. It can liberate humanity from the “sacred”, without negating it. It can profane the “sacred” without destroying the myth behind; it does not simply politicise. And if play is to cause changes and form our lives in better ways, this would be through its capacity to be an act of profanation by itself. But, unfortunately, this tendency according to Agamben is in decline and the need to regain it is a political necessity (Agamben 2006 : 127). What are the conditions of play today? Can it seriously play a role in our everyday lives? Who could re-attribute its capability to profane? Defining play There have been many definitions of play from different disciplines and orientations. Sutton – Smith in his book The Ambiguity of Play refers frequently to Mihail Spariosu who had called play “amphibolous” describing a basic disagreement between the Western philosophers over whether play is an orderly and rule- governed affair according to the common western society norms, or a chaotic, violent and indeterminate interaction of forces, according to some more modern approaches (Sutton Smith 1997/2001: 80). Roger Caillois had also seen two poles in play, but as a continuum where diversified forms could be set. On one extreme we find “paidia”, an “indivisible principle”, common to diversion, turbulence, free improvisation and carefree gaiety which is manifested by uncontrolled fantasy. At the other end, we find “ludus”, bound with “arbitrary, imperative and purposely tedious conventions”. The more the “frolic and impulsive exuberance” of paidia is “disciplined by an inversed tendency to its anarchic and capricious nature”, the more play approaches ludus (Caillois 1958/2001: 13). The Western European thought mostly followed the rationalistic common pattern and embraced the politicized, ruled form of play surpassing its anarchic and vivid features. This can be easily seen by the well known definitions of Huizinga and Caillois who, although they described play as free and unproductive activity, still insist on its dependency on the rules and its separation from everyday life. (Caillois 1958/2001: 43, Huizinga 1955: 13) Is it play or game? The old scholars, Huizinga and Caillois, did not especially differentiate the two terms. It seems that the rules that institutionalised play gave form to games. Play appears to be the idea, the notion, the anarchic and spontaneous basis, the activity based on fantasy, what Caillois called paidia, as Plato and Aristotle first put it. Accordingly, games seem to be the expressions and the forms of play that are governed by rules, demand discipline and form hierarchies, need a constraint space and time, reflecting more the ludus element. Generally, one could assume that play as a notion precedes games – it is their presupposition; it is the play ‘instinct’ that inspires the formation of forms. (Huizinga in Wark 2007: 181) In our times, with the explosion of the video game industry, the two words seem to have enclosed different features and ideas. Edward Castronova highlights the difference as follows: “Play is an intense, survival- relevant action that is not serious… Play is make believe… Play is an easy- to- copy behaviour that brings joy… Games are not the same thing as play. Games are designed goal environments with uncertain outcomes. They are social institutions. Games are a perfect environment for creating play, but also they appear under other circumstances. Elections… stock markets… wars are games.” (Castronova 2007: 100,101) In the digital era, games in the form of video games distant themselves more from play. Games compared to play can be described, can be analysed; they become a product, a commodity; they can be copied, copyrighted and become a subject of control. As Alexander R. Galloway notes, the video game is a cultural object bound by history and materiality, consisting of an electronic computational device and a game simulated in software (Galloway, 2006: 1) Risks of play Mckenzie Wark writes in his recent book Gamer Theory that games are no longer a past time, outside or alongside of life. They are now the very form of life, and death, and time, itself (Wark 2007: 06) To a certain degree, every civilization can be described and characterised by its games but what happens today is that life itself has taken the form of a game; of game and not play. While gaming platforms today are being used widely for different disciplines we might need to wonder: What are the risks play runs in this context? How could they be faced? The risk of contamination According to the classic thinkers of play, there was one main threat for play, its “contamination” by the ordinary life. Play could only be considered as a “stepping out of real life, into a temporary sphere with a disposition of its own” (Huizinga 1955: 8). The world of play and that of everyday life were considered as two different universes, antagonistic to each other (Caillois, 1958/2001: 44, 53). This austere distinction was what the situationists tried to break and to transcend. “Play, radically broken from a confined ludic time and space, must invade the whole of life”, they stated in 1958. The situationists with their notions of the psychogeographies, the derive, the situation and the détournement had proposed a fusion of play into the cities, a total swift where the player is in reality the “liver”. In our days, a different fusion of play occurred. Our everyday life is a fusion in itself of the virtual and the real. As Edward Castronova mentions “the real world can be a terribly empty place.” Synthetic worlds may offer experiences and opportunities that one might not have in their real life. Of course, “reality remains reality, strongly sensated but unfiltered, raw. It will always command attention, but it has long since abandoned the claim to all of our attention. We already live partly in media. Games are just the latest improvement.” (Castronova 2007: 30, 69) The risk of productivity Play is longer by definition an occasion of pure waste; waste of time, energy, ingenuity and skill. Play’s second major risk is the one formed by productivity, by players who belong to the generation of the prosumers, as they are producers and consumers at the same time. Play nowadays becomes part of the immaterial labour, within which as Lazzarato notes ‘leisure time’ and ‘working time’ are increasingly fused, making play – in our case- inseparable from work (Lazzarato 1997). This affective labor of play produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity that at the end is defined as game. Within this content stand today’s synthetic worlds where the players contribute voluntarily with their work and behaviour to the formation of the gaming worlds and the augmentation of the virtual economy. Communication is continually improved as the power of this form is found in the collective process, in the users/prosumers social relations. People of course might as well make profit for themselves. This kind of play can be to their advantage. But one can not overlook the fact that this era of ludocapitalism, as Dibbel frames it, is “a curious new post-industrial revolution, driven by play as the first one was driven by steam”. (Dibbell in Shaviro 2007) The risk of being the alibi The risk of play being exploited and being used as an alibi for economical or political profit is not a new one. The ambiguous –in ethic terms - economy of the casinos, the lotteries and the hippodromes or even the economy of the sports industry are such phenomena that have given birth to discussions, problems and even scandals for most of the countries of the Western world. However, the highest risk for play today is found in the exploitation of play being made by the military entertainment complex. War as a game is an old metaphor. Chess and Go and especially the 19th century Kriegsspiel which was used to aid Prussian officers, could be considered as predecessors of the games that would be used for military entertaining purposes later on (Halter 2002). But what the media and especially the video games changed was the possibilities given for nationalistic propaganda. Games like America’s Army, are at the same time a recruiting tool, an edugame, a test bed and tool and a propaganda game. Such games can influence attitudes and behaviours and win a communication battle that would otherwise be lost. Creating falsifying images of super-clean pure war, as seen on the screens, the games succeed in “using sweet power to win a war on ideas” (Neiborg 2007: 79) Summarizing the risks above, the impression given is that we have “nowhere to hide outside the gamespace” (Wark 2007: 183). But, are we trapped within a total game or is play itself trapped as well at the end? The sovereignity of the game over play today is a fact. Having been institutionalized, play has been accredited with the seriousness of an academic, social, political and economic value and has become an issue of controversial discussion accordingly. But in reality, again, it is mostly games we are talking about, not play. Contemporary play is purposely sacralised and distant, used as an excuse for games’ abuses. Being considered sacred, play’s case reminds us of religion. Religion does not unify all; on the contrary it keeps the roles distinct and separated. It keeps people apart from the divine (Agamben 2006: 124). So it happens with play, keeping the players apart from play itself. Could this separation be broken? And could play become an important contributory factor to our lives’ amelioration? Setting play free “It was in fact from art that play broke free” Raoul Vaneigem wrote in reference to Dada (Vaneigem 1967). To transcend rigid and crystallized forms, rules need to be broken. One can play by rules, or play with the rules. Freedom can be regained by those who can play with today’s forms of play, who can appropriate them, see through and reverse them, by those who can profane what is considered sacred. Following the famous predecessors of the dada, Surrealism, Fluxus and Situationism, artists today turn again towards play and use it as a means to challenge stereotypes, to offer new ways of reading and understanding, to break the constraints and offer new perspectives. Art merged with new media, activism, philosophy, politics and social sciences takes the role of the animator, the hacker, the player – “liver” today. Artists working on these fields through projects that do not necessarily need to be game – based, reveal play’ s multifaceted original character and propose means for its use, liberation and expansion within different sides of life. Play as play… Play can not be doubted and its fundamental role, original features and continuous presence is what some artists highlight. Axel Stockburger’s Tokyo Arcade Warriors – Shibuya and William Wegman’ s Dog Duet (Two Dogs and a ball) showcase how play absorbs one in the most serious and utter way. Documenting only the figures of players and not the action itself, one can still not deny or doubt play even if it is hidden. Other artists working on the field, show how playfulness is kept intact, while common playgrounds are being transformed into new ones based on technology. Such are the cases of Himalaya’ s Head by Devart where a snow war takes place between physical and virtual players or Jumping Rope by Orna Portugaly, Daphna Talithman and Sharon Younger, where participants are invited to jump a rope which is being turned by two virtual projected characters. Play back in action… Artists like the Ludic Society and Gordan Savicic follow a neo – situationist approach of play; they bring action back to the real dimension and spread it in the cities. In their projects they create ludic ambiances and city walks where the notions of the “dérivé”, the “détournement” and the “psychogeographies” are being appropriated to raise questions about today’s everyday life and potentialities for playfulness. Objects of Desire by the Ludic Society is a playful metaphor where objects take the place of subjects, with obsessions and desires that they follow to find their home. Gordan Savicic’ s Constraint City / the pain of everyday life is based on a corset with high torque servo motors and a WIFI-enabled game-console, that when worn, can write and read the city codes while also being a fetish object causing pain according to the strength of signal it gets. Following a different direction, David Valentine and MediaShed, also re-invite play back to the ordinary life, as seen on their video The duellists that documents a CCTV parkour performance. Two free-runners run an acrobatic competition in a shopping mall of Manchester Arndale. The fluid, uninterrupted movement of them acting as players re - energizes the environment in the most vivid and spontaneous way. Play caught in between… Other artists look into limits between the virtual and the real in today’ s play. The work of Silver and True named Sell your Rolex comments on the virtual dimension lived by millions of people today. Taking the roles of the user and its avatar, players note that behaviours of the virtual world are odd, funny and embarrassing when brought back to real life. How accurate is simulation after all in realistic terms? The MIT Lab with Stiff People’ s League mingles the two dimensions through a mixed reality game of soccer, happening simultaneously in the real space and in the world of Second Life. The common relationship between physical and virtual world is inverted as physical players need to rely on the virtual ones to play the game. Play reclaimed… Different questions are being raised by artists regarding play’s exploitation for purposes of political, nationalistic and ideological propaganda. Is morality a question? Are people conscious enough about what they are playing? John Klima in his project The Great Game.Epilogue brings reality into a game context as he incorporates in a child’s arcade ride true information from the conflict in Afghanistan, which has been collected by the Department of Defense of the US. John Paul Bichard with the Art of War addresses the issue of the representation of violence and its ways of interpretation through the contemporary media. Through two video works with footages from the army, one cannot tell what is real and what is imaginary anymore. In a similar direction, Vladan Joler has created the Schengen Information System, Version 1.0.3, a game where the player takes on the role of the activist who should intrude the building of the Schengen Information System and destroy the archives. Making use of publicly accessible technology and information, the artist has managed to make a realistic reconstruction and reverse the common use of games for military training purposes. Derivart wishing to tackle a socio-economical issue -that of real estate in Spain - use play to situate a problem and raise people’s awareness. The Burbujometro, showing the prices of apartments in different Spanish cities in the form of bubbles, that the user can shoot, criticizes the building boom of the 2000s. Play 2.0… The Folded-in project, created by Personal Cinema and the Erasers is a different critique on today’s play. The project examines the notion of borders in the era of the web 2.0 social networks. In the form of an online game application which reverses and criticizes the platform of YouTube, the projects seeks to find if players in the digital spaces could be liberated from their common prejudices and beliefs and to what extent they are supporters of immaterial labour, being the ideal prosumers. Taking this problem more to its extremes, one meets the phenomenon of the gold farming. Ge Jin with his documentary The Gold Farmers examines how the growth of virtual economy has given birth to the phenomenon of the gaming sweatshops and aims to answer how it leads play to become real work and what facts are hidden behind it. Play re-discussed… But how far can games and their creators go when observing, reproducing and criticizing today’s real world? Danny Ledonne, a young artist from Colorado, polarised the audience when he made a videogame of the Columbine assassination in the 90’s. Wishing to express this controversy, he made a documentary about the game investigating the issues of games, violence, and ethics. A lot of answers regarding the strategies followed by artists today and the phenomenon of the play culture, are also given in the 8 bit documentary by Marcin Ramocki & Justin Strawhand where they examine the overall influence play has in our everyday culture. CONCLUSION Play in our times presents a paradox. Despite its wide use and continuous presence in different forms of cultures, it is distant and trapped in its own formations, the games. Games are being accused; play is being sacrilised and is placed on a pedestal. Running certain risks, within this structure, play’s influential role on our culture is questioned. If, following Giorgio Agamben, play’s significance lies on the fact that it can detach humanity from the “sacred”, play would need to liberate itself first from the constraints of the sacred. To achieve this, one should not deny play; because this would lead to its cancellation. What one should do is to profane, to neglect, to surpass the constraints and break the rules. And this again can happen only through play itself, through its anarchic and vivid features that are today being wept out. This is how the actions taken by the artists can be described: as actions of profanity where they appropriate the myth and reverse the ceremony of the sacred. This violation is also an act of play itself that is then set free from all constraints. But there is one last point to remember: According to Agamben, profanation gains its complete meaning only when what has been profaned, is then rendered back to the people, at their disposal to start all over again. So this act is not an act of cancellation or politicisation; it is an act about raising awareness and about re-assigning to play its capacity to become a passage for true life, as Vaneigem would describe it. Can art fulfill this? Let’s hope so and wait and see…

#### Truth and predictability are nihilistic illusions built upon a myth of sameness and unity grounded in a fear of the flux and movement which lie at the heart of life – embrace the ecstasy of risk and the glory of active interpretation which uses force to wrest meaning from the abyss of nihilism.

**Lotringer, 1** – Professor of Foreign Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, (Sylvere, “The Dance of Signs” in Hatred of Capitalism: A Semiotext(e) Reader ed. Kraus&Lotringer, Los Angeles:Semiotext(e), pg 174-176)

Freud is not blind to this: "The producer which the author makes his Zoe adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far reaching similarity - no, a complete agreement in its essence - with the analytical method which consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill" (Standard Edition, IX, 88). Such is the powerful thrust of similitude. Freud has no more qualms to reduce "poetic creations" to real persons or the "Pompeian fancy" to a simple "psychiatric study." Beneath the trappings of truth, on the razor's edge of demonstration, forces are confronting each other in order to turn the process - the text -into a product. If Gradiva adheres so perfectly to the analytical mold, the analysis of the novel must serve as an absolute proof, in Freud's words, of the theory of the unconscious. Absolute proof - or absolute counter-proof... Even thought "absolute" is clearly too strong a word for such a circum-scribed operation, to counter Freud's interpretation and thus unsettle he theory of the unconscious is indeed the substance of the present attempt. Not to replace Freud's elaborate construct with another, more powerful, mode of evaluation would certainly prove the wisdom in the face of the illusion of truth. Although "nihilistic" at heart, such a perspective is not bound to be simply negative. It can attest to a growing force. I realize that I can overcome the temptation of total interpretations, whose values are universal (they are actually symptoms of fear and apathy). To destroy the belief in the law, to dissipate the fiction of predictability, to reject the sage recurrence of the "same," this is not just a "critical" stand. It is an act of force. But destruction must not open onto an absence of values, worthless or meaninglessness. It must lead to a new evaluation. Nietzsche sees in the wisdom of the East a principle of decadence, a weakening of the power of appropriation. Force of intention matters more than will to truth. To reject truth without intensifying the force of invention still participates in the ascetic ideal, thus in ressentiment. "To read off a text without interposing an interpretation" therefore is "hardly possible" (The Will to Power, 479). I must use my creative forces to create values without falling into the inertia of truth or an anemia of will. I must render the text, and the world, to their "disturbing and enigmatic character"; will them incomprehensible, elusive, "in flux," only indebted to perspective valuations: "The greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present" (WP, 655). Inner decay: to dance away over oneself. Motion, not emotions. Freud's interpretation resists the false neutrality of science. It only shows a sign of decline when it aims for the truth, when it succumbs to the temptation of unity, the sick security of monism, the illusion of a reconciliation. A reactive interpretation, it assumes powerful, but fabricated, weapons: the difference between objects and subjects, cause and effect, means and ends, etc. That Gradiva presents a certain order of succession in no way proves that individual moments are related to one another as cause and effect, that they obey a "law" and a calculus but rather that different factions abruptly confront each other in their attempt to draw their ultimate consequence at every moment. "As long as there is a structure, as long as there is a method, or better yet as long as structure and method exist through the mental, through intelligence, time is trapped - or else we imagine we have trapped it" (John Cage, Pour les Oiseaux. Belfond, 1976, 34). Structural analysis properly discerned that a narrative establishes | a confusion between time (succession) and logic (cause and effect). However, instead of "delogifying" time, it forced narrative time to sub-mit to narrative logic. Far from being dispelled, the confusion became the very springboard of analysis! It is high time to take advantage of this latency of the narrative, of the divorce between consequence and construction, in order to "rechronocize" succession. I will, here and now, stop wanting the story to go somewhere. I will forget what I know feebly, in advance, in order to gather the whole complexity of forces at play in a text. I will learn to resist the melody of casual relations and the torpor of narrative accumulations in order to reinvent the intensity of risks, ceaselessly menacing and forever being reborn.

## 2AC

### AT: Mann

#### Dissent is real and effective

Bleiker 2k (Roland Bleiker, Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague; “Popular Dissent**,** Human Agency and Global Politics,” Cambridge University Press)

Dissent has become a significant transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspects of global politics. In fact, dissent has become what could be called a transversal phenomenon - a political practice that not only transgresses national boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations. The term transversal draws attention to various political transformations that are currently taking place. It has emerged in response to a growing need to rethink the manner in which the domain of international relations has traditionally been conceptualised. David Campbell, for instance, argues convincingly that globalised life is best seen 'as a series of transversal struggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or transnational relations'.2 The latter, he points out, are modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currently being questioned. By contrast, to conceptualise global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multi-layered interactions that make up contemporary life. It is to recognise the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, capital - in short, 'the increasing irruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons'.3

### 2AC – Queer Theory

#### The alternative dooms liberation of lesbians – queer theory homogenizes male and female interests

Jeffreys 94(Sheila, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Melbourne, Women’s Studies International Forum, “The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality In the Academy, Volume 17, Issue 5, p. 459-472)

The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians. The developing field of lesbian and gay studies is dominated now by the queer impulse. Lesbian feminism is conspicuous by its absence. Lesbian feminism starts from the understanding that the interests of lesbians and gay men are in many respects very different because lesbians are members of the political class of women. Lesbian liberation requires, according to this analysis, the destruction of men's power over women. In queer theory and queer studies, lesbians seem to appear only where they can assimilate seamlessly into gay male culture and politics. No difference is generally recognised in interests, culture, history between lesbians and gay men. The new field of the study of 'sexuality' seems similarly to be dominated by gay male sexual politics and interests. Both areas are remarkably free of feminist influence. As I discuss here, there is seldom any mention in queer theorising of sexuality of issues which are of concern to feminists and lesbian feminists, such as sexual violence and pornography or any politics of sexual desire or practice, and there is no recognition of the specificity of lesbian experience. Within traditional Women's Studies, lesbian students and teachers have long been angry at the 'lesbian-free' nature of courses and textbooks. A good example is Rosemarie Tong's Women's Studies reader Feminist Thought (1989). Although many of the feminist theorists covered in the book are lesbians, lesbian feminism is not one of the varieties of feminist thought included here. The index directs the reader to find lesbian feminist thought in three pages under the heading of 'Radical feminism and sexuality' (Tong, 1989). Lesbians might well have expected to find the new lesbian and gay studies more sympathetic to their interests, but that is only true in practice if they see themselves as a variety of gay men rather than as women. The new lesbian and gay studies is 'feminismfree.' By not recognising the different interests, history, culture, experience of lesbians, lesbian and gay studies homogenises the interests of women into those of men. It was precisely this disappearance of women's interests and experience in the malestream academic world which caused the development of Women's Studies in the first place. It cannot therefore be an unalloyed cause for celebration in the 1990s that lesbian and gay studies are becoming sufficiently well recognised to have a whole new journal GLQ and a first reader, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (Abelove, Barale, & Halperin, 1993). Both are American in origin and content. Even a casual glance at these publications suggests that lesbians and feminists have considerable cause for concern. It is not simply an abstract desire to right the injustice of lesbian disappearance which motivates my concern at the way that lesbian and gay studies are going. The work of this new field does and will increasingly influence the ideas and practices of lesbian and gay culture. Academia is not hermetically sealed but reflects and influences the world outside the academy. The disappearance of lesbians into an economically powerful commercial gay culture in the streets and the clubs will be exacerbated by what is happening in queer theory. The editorial of the first issue of GLQ celebrates its commitment to 'queer' politics. The queer perspective is not a gender-neutral one. Many lesbians, perhaps the vast majority of lesbian feminists, feel nothing but hostility toward and alienation from the word queer and see queer politics as very specifically masculine. The editorial tells us that the journal will approach all topics through a queer lens. "We seek to publish a journal that will bring a queer perspective to bear on any and all topics touching on sex and sexuality" (Dinshaw & Halperin, GLQ, 1993; p. iii). We are told that the Q in the title of the journal GLQ has two meanings, quarterly and also "the fractious, the disruptive, the irritable, the impatient, the unapologetic, the bitchy, the camp, the queer" (p. iii). This definition of the word 'queer' should alert readers to its masculine bias. The adjectives accompanying it here refer to male gay culture. They arise from traditional notions of what is camp. Camp, as we shall see, lies at the very foundation of queer theory and politics and is inimical to women's and lesbian interests. But before looking at the problems with camp in detail, it is worth considering another way in which this list of adjectives might not sit well with lesbian feminism. Although gay men's rebellion against oppression might well have been so mild that it could be expressed in terms like irritability, this has not been the way that lesbians have traditionally phrased their rebellion. Perhaps because lesbians have a great deal more to fight, that is, the whole system of male supremacy, rage has been a more prevalent emotion than irritability. The early womanifesto of lesbian feminism, the Woman- Identified-Woman paper, expressed it thus: "A Lesbian is the rage of all women condensed to the point of explosion" (Radicalesbians, 1988, p. 17). Irritable is how one might feel about not having garbage collected, not about ending the rape, murder, and torture of women, including lesbians. Some queer studies writers are currently seeking to establish that 'camp' is a fundamental part of 'queer.' There is still a controversy about what constitutes camp, with gay male critics opposing their own notions to that expressed in the famous Susan Sontag piece and pointing out that her version is heterosexist (Miller, 1993; Sontag, 1986). Sontag saw camp as a sensibility and one that was not necessarily queer or gay. Moe Meyer, in the volume the POLITICS and POETICS of CAMP, which is said on the blurb inside the cover to contain essays by "some of the foremost critics working in queer theory" says that camp is "solely a queer discourse" and certainly not just a "sensibility" but "a suppressed and denied oppositional critique embodied in the signifying practices that processually constitute queer identities" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 1). Rather, the function of camp is the "production of queer social visibility" and the "total body of performative practices and strategies used to enact a queer identity" (Meyer, 1994b; p. 5). So camp is defined here not just as one aspect of what it is to be queer, but as absolutely fundamental to queer identity. Camp appears, on examination, to be based largely on a male gay notion of the feminine. As his example of camp political tactics, Meyer uses the Black drag queen, Joan Jett Blakk, who ran as a mayoral candidate in Chicago in 1991. This man ran as a 'Queer Nation' candidate. He is referred to by female pronouns throughout this piece, which raises some difficulties in itself for women who wish to recognize themselves in the text. Meyer tells us that there were some objections from what he calls "assimilationist gays" who saw the drag queen political tactic as "flippant and demeaning." The implication is that men who objected did so for conservative motives, whereas in fact they might have been expressing profeminist sympathies. For women and lesbians who have rejected femininity, the celebration of it by a gay man is likely to be seen as insulting rather than as something with which to identify in 'queer' solidarity. Actually, women might well want more women in parliament rather than men wearing the clothing that has been culturally assigned to women.

### AT: Edelman

#### Alternative doesn’t solve – Edelman’s use of queer theory can’t be universalized.

Snediker, 6 (Michael, Visiting Assistant Professor of American Literature at Mount Holyoke College, Postmoden Culture, Vol 16, “Queer Optimism”, May, http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/postmodern\_culture/v016/16.3snediker.html)

Edelman's might be one way of refusing the logic of reproductive futurism, but not the only one. That there would be many possible queer courses of action might indeed seem to follow from Edelman's invoking of Lacanian truth ("Wunsch") as characterized by nothing so much as its extravagant, recalcitrant particularity. "The Wunsch," Lacan writes in a passage cited in No Future's introduction, "does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws--even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being" (6). This truth, which Edelman aligns with "queerness" (and ergo with negativity, the death-drive, jouissance, etc.) "does not have the character of a universal law." Edelman, for all his attentiveness to the Lacanian "letter of the law," glosses Lacan's own argument with a symptomatic liberality. "Truth, like queerness," Edelman writes, "finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value" (6). Lacan, however, does not speak, even in Jacques-Alain Miller's translation, of a "general good." He speaks of a universal, which might be good or bad. Furthermore, if the only characteristic universally applicable to this "truth, like queerness" is its particularity, what sort of particularity voids every notion of a general good? Might so intransigent a particularity sometimes not void a universal, good or bad? My line of inquiry might seem petty, but my question, in fact, illuminates how little Edelman's argument can hold onto the particularity on which it is partly premised. "The queer," Edelman insists, "insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier" (6). Edelman likewise insists that "queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign" (7). The ubiquity of "always" and "every" in Edelman's argument is nearly stunning, and it seems to me indicative of No Future's coerciveness, as a different passage from No Future's introduction quite handily demonstrates: Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order--such a hope, after all, would only reproducce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer--but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. (4)Always this, always this, always that. This absoluteness in Edelman's characterization of affirmation, meant to rally and provoke, recalls Sedgwick's incredulous reading of Fredric Jameson's ukase, "Always historicize." "What could have less to do," Sedgwick rightly asks, "with historicizing than the commanding, atemporal adverb 'always'" ("Paranoid Reading" 125)? What, for that matter, could have less to do with particularizations? The axiomatic thrust of Edelman's "always" would seem to make the world so irrevocably one thing that response to the world would amount to one thing. But still: why would rejecting a primary attachment to futurity (regardless of what this futurity always does or doesn't do) necessarily require embodying negativity? Edelman's queer pessimism positions itself as "our" only option without having exhausted what other options might glimmeringly look like. This glimmer doesn't conjure the sort of horizon Edelman would be so quick to dismantle. Rather, it suggests that not all optimisms are a priori equivalent to each other. And as importantly, that not all queer theories need look like Edelman's. "As a particular story . . . of why storytelling fails," Edelman writes, "queer theory, as I construe it, marks the 'other' side of politics . . . the 'side' outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism's unquestioned good" (7). This account of queer theory, even as construed by one theorist, hardly seems like a "particular" story, not at least particular enough. Queer theory, on this account, doesn't seem like an escape from the political's claustrophobically refracted unavailing sides, but a claustrophobia unto itself.

#### Edelman’s alternative perpetuates essentialism and does not address material oppression.

Edwards, 6 (Tim, Senior Lecturer of Sociology at the University of Leicester, Routledge, “Cultures of Masculinity” p85, http://books.google.com/books?id=jiDisMipzEsC&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s)

Gay liberation is problematic not least because liberation *per se* is problematic, both theoretically and politically. In theoretical terms, the notion of liberation tends to imply essentialism and, in relation to sexuality, this is compounded by its conflation with the concept of repression and the assertion of some otherwise contained or constrained sexual desire. The difficulty here is not so much the charge of essentialism, which must remain in some senses merely a descriptive term, but rather the sense of confusion invoked concerning what exactly is being liberated: a sexual desire, a sexual identity, a sexual community, or all three? This is not to deny in the least that gay men still constitute a marginalized, stigmatized, and on occasions, even *demonized* group, yet such an experience is perhaps more accurately understood as a problem of subordination, emancipation or indeed oppression. The term liberation therefore remains rather inadequate in theoretical terms. This sense of ambiguity or even ambivalence concerning gay liberation was, however, also illustrated more academically. Some of the earliest works on gay politics, particularly those of Hocquengheim and Mieli, attributed a liberatory force to gay desire in celebrating promiscuity, pushing the boundaries of decency and more generally going against the mores of mainstream heterosexual society; while others, particularly those of Altman and Weeks, saw gay politics as a culturally specific phenomenon contingent on histories of movements towards reform and slowly shifting morals and values (Altman, 1971; Hocquenghem, 1972; Mieli, 1980; Weeks, 1977). It was perhaps not surprising, then, that much of this ambivalence should also be played out through a series of academic debates that followed the onset of gay liberation. These more theoretical debates were in themselves often founded on the political involvements of young writers and academics making their careers in colleges and universities. Most of these controversies centred on various, and often violently opposed, perspectives of the development of commercial gay culture and the practices and attitudes of gay men, most notoriously those of the overtly sexualised and hypermasculine clone.

Psychoanalysis has enabled modern governmentality – its techniques are used manage populations and develop disciplinary society

Milchman and Rosenberg, 2Milchman teaches in the department of Political Science of Queens College of the City University of New York. He has published on Marxism, modern genocide, Max Weber, Heidegger, Foucault, and postmodernism. He has co-edited Postmodernism and the Holocaust, with Alan Rosenberg (Rodopi, 1998) and Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust, with Alan Rosenberg (Humanities Press, 1996), Alan is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Queens College of the City University of New York. He has published widely on psychoanalysis, the Holocaust, and the philosophies of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault. Among the books that he has co-edited are Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, with Alan Milchman (University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming); Contemporary Portrayals of Auschwitz: Philosophical Challenges, with James Watson and Detlef B. Linke (Humanity Books); Psychoanalytic Versions of the Human Condition, with Paul Marcus (NYU press, 1998); Healing Their Wounds: Psychotherapy with Holocaust Survivors and Their Families, with Paul Marcus (Praeger, 1989); and Echoes from the Holocaust: Philosophical Reflections on a Dark Time, with Gerald Myers (Temple University Press, 1988). “A Foucauldian Analysis of Psychoanalysis: A Discipline that ‘Disciplines’” Academy for the Study of the Psychoanalytic Arts, <http://www.academyanalyticarts.org/milch&rosen.htm/>

For Foucault, the very genesis of the discipline of psychoanalysis is itself linked to historical changes in the exercise of power-relations, and in particular to the emergence of governmentality. According to the later Foucault, modern power-relations cannot be grasped on the basis of political theory's traditional model of power-law-sovereignty-repression. This juridical model of power, which still dominates political theory, and sees power as emanating from a sovereign, from the top down, ignores the fact that power today also comes from below. As Leslie Paul Thiele has argued in his explication of Foucault's contribution to a theory of power: "Power forms an omnipresent web of relations, and the individuals who support this web are as much the producers and transmitters of power as they are its objects." In place of the juridical model of power, Foucault argues that modern power-relations are instantiated through what he designates as "governmentality." For Foucault: The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. `Government' did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. .... To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. For Foucault, then, the operations of the modern state are not restricted to interdiction or repression in the political sense, but have expanded to incorporate the practices of governmentality. Government, in the Foucauldian sense, depends on the knowledge generated by the human sciences, by the disciplines, in particular psychoanalysis; indeed, the state claims that it governs on the basis of that knowledge. Here, the central role of the human sciences in the operation of the developing disciplinary society, and its techniques for the control and management of its citizens becomes especially clear. Moreover, governmentality, and the technologies for the control of individuals, are by no means limited to the state. Indeed, according to Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, modern, liberal societies do not leave the regulation of conduct solely or even primarily to the operations of the state and its bureaucracies: "Liberal government identifies a domain outside 'politics,' and seeks to manage it without destroying its existence and its autonomy." This is accomplished through the activities of a host of institutions and agents not formally part of the state apparatus, including psychoanalytic facilities and analysts. As Nikolas Rose has pointed out, psychoanalysis, like "All the sciences which have the prefix `psy-' or `psycho-' have their roots in this shift in the relationship between social power and the human body, in which regulatory systems have sought to codify, calculate, supervise, and maximize the level of functioning of individuals. The `psy sciences' were born within a project of government of the human soul and the construction of the person as a manageable subject." As a manifestation of governmentality and its power-relations, psychoanalysis is implicated in the control of the individual. For Foucault, psychoanalysis is a discipline that "disciplines," that helps to create politically and economically socialized, useful, cooperative, and -- as one of the hallmarks of bio-power -- docile individuals. Indeed, according to John Forrester, for Foucault, psychoanalysis is "the purest version of the social practices that exercise domination in and through discourse, whose power lies in words, whose words can never by anything other than instruments of power." Of course, the aim of the analyst is not control, but the "mental health" of the individual and the "betterment" of society. Nonetheless, the result of the psychoanalytic management-oriented conception of the subject is an individual who is susceptible to techno-medical control. Moreover, as Nikolas Rose has suggested, the power-knowledge obtained by psychoanalysis (and indeed all of the psy sciences) and its technologies for the control of the individual: fed back into social life at a number of levels. Individuals could be classified and distributed to particular social locations in the light of them -- in schools, jobs, ranks in the army, types of reformatory institutions, and so forth. Further, in consequence, new means emerged for the codification and analysis of the consequences of organizing classrooms, barracks, prisons, production lines, the family, and social life itself....Hence, the psy knowleges could feed back into more general economic and social programs, throwing up new problems and opportunities for attempts to maximize the use of the human resources of the nation and to increase its levels of personal health and well-being. Whatever its impact or health and welfare, this power-knowledge enhanced the degree of control to which the person was subject, and made it possible to effectively discipline the individual. Indeed, the existence of our developing disciplinary society is inconceivable without the psy sciences, and the power-relations which they consolidate. The discipline and control of the individual to which psychoanalysis made its signal contribution, was linked to its conception of, and commitment to, normalization. Foucault signalled the increasing role of normality and normalization in the functioning of the developing disciplinary society in Discipline and Punish: "The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the `social worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements." For Foucault, discipline and normalization were inseparable components of the emergence of the human sciences, and their technologies. Indeed, he asserted that "a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life." Psychoanalysis did not break with this complex. Indeed, according to Foucault, "Freud was well aware of all this. He was aware of the superior strength of his position on the matter of normalization." Indeed, psychoanalysis was thoroughly implicated in the societal process in which the norm increasingly supplanted the law, in which the West was "becoming a society which is essentially defined by the norm." For Foucault: "The norm becomes the criterion for evaluating individuals. As it truly becomes a society of the norm, medicine, par excellence the science of the normal and the pathological, assumes the status of a royal science." Lest one conclude that Foucault is not referring to psychoanalysis here, he is quick to point out that "psychoanalysis, not only in the United States, but also in France, functions massively as a medical practice: even if it is not always practiced by doctors, it certainly functions as therapy, as a medical type of intervention. From this point of view, it is very much a part of this network of medical 'control' which is being established all over." Deviation from the norm, in the establishment of which psychoanalysis played a signal role, the anomaly, became the object of the technologies and therapeutic techniques of the psy sciences, psychoanalysis among them. The theological conception of evil had given way to the psychoanalytic conception of deviance, in the combat against which the analyst was now enlisted to play a leading role. As Hubert Dreyfus has claimed, "Freudian theory thus reinforces the collective practices that allow norms based on alleged sciences of human nature to permeate every aspect of our lives." These practices then become a lynchpin of the developing disciplinary society and its techniques for managing people.

### 2AC – Ballot Commodification

#### Even if they win a link argument, some level of speaking for Others is inevitable and can be productive – the affirmative is a prerequisite to hearing the voice of the marginalized

Marino, 5(Lauren Marino, Macalester Department of Philosophy; “Speaking for Others,” Macalester Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 14: Iss. 1, Article 4)

If the self is located within language games the there is a commonality between those who share language games. This removes some of the barriers between selves and I do have access to the experience of those with whom I share language games. Sharing language games means sharing experience. I am able to speak for those who language games I play. There are some problems with this understanding. Alcoff thinks membership in a group is not precise or determinate. It is unclear which groups I could belong to and which of those groups I should single out to affiliate myself. More importantly, membership in a group doesn’t necessarily mean an authority to speak for the whole group. However, if we accept that the self is constituted within language, then those who share language games with me have direct access to my experience in away that no one can ever have access to a Cartesian mind. We do not need to ask for absolute identity, language and experience between speakers but just a commonality. Furthermore, Bernstein argues that we cannot speak without speaking for other people. 6 The speaker’s location is necessarily a location in relation to other people. The relationship cannot be removed, and we cannot avoid it. Speaking at all makes speaking for others inevitable. We return to the intuitive response to the struggle of oppressed groups: have the group speak for itself. Speaking becomes a type of agency in which I construct myself because contrary to a Cartesian self, selves do not exist prior to or separate from language. To lose my speech is to lose myself. The oppressed have the ability to communicate with each other and through their language game they are able to discuss their struggle with one another. Sharing languages games enables the oppressed to a specific, limited dimension of power. Their language game will always fail to communicate their struggle to those who have not been initiated into it. They have direct access to the experience of oppression and their agency, but they can only reach their own group. Those on the margin cannot reach those in the center. On the other hand, those in the center, the elites, share a language that can reach the majority of society. It is a language game they are familiar with and can use adeptly. However, they do not have the experience with or access to the language game of the oppressed. They have the power to use their language but nothing to say. The catch-22 is the choice between a group who embodies the agency and the dimensions of political struggle against oppression without a way to communicate it to the larger community, and a group with the language to reach society but is ignorant of the political struggle. There lies a need for a synergy between the experience of the oppressed on the margins and the language game of those in the center. The synergy requires a speaker who comes from the oppressed but has knowledge of the language game of the center. Such a person could incorporate the experience of the oppressed into a new language game that could be accessed by those in power. The concern is what is lost and sacrificed in translation. If the language games are so disparate that initiation in one, offers no insight into the rules of the other, than there is doubt that translation can be done at all. If translation cannot be done, the best to be hoped for is cooption forcing the margins into the mainstream.

### 2AC – Zupancic

#### Perm do both - embrace compassion because it’s difficult and fraught with risk

Frazer 6

The Review of Politics (2006), 68: 49-78 Cambridge University Press

Michael Frazer's research focuses on Enlightenment political philosophy and its relevance for contemporary political theory. His current book project, “The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today,” defends a psychologically holistic approach to political reflection through an examination of such authors as David Hume, Adam Smith and J. G. Herder. Dr. Frazer has also published articles on Maimonides, Nietzsche, John Rawls and Leo Strauss in such journals as "Political Theory" and "The Review of Politics." After receiving his B.A. from Yale University and his Ph.D. from Princeton University, Dr. Frazer spent the 2006-7 academic year as a postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown University.

Assistant professor – HARVARD

There is a second way in which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but we also risk developing contempt for the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts. Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows' plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for creative achievement. By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet, or psychologist—the born and inevitable unriddler of human souls—could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life, and against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful experience of the emotion as creativity-enhancing and life-promoting. In doing so, Nietzsche's protagonist warns against those who unduly oppose compassion as well as those who unduly celebrate it. Both sides treat pain as something to be soothed away rather than harnessed for creative purposes; they differ only in whether the pain to be alleviated is our own or that of others. From the ethically authoritative perspective of life, both can be seen as opponents of human flourishing.

### 2AC – Anthropocentrism

#### Our critiques are one in the same – the category of bare life connects and sustains the categories of human and other beings – only through an understanding of this construction can we hope to stop this form of violence by the sovereign

Oliver, 7 – W. Alton Jones Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Women's Studies at Vanderbilt University (Kelly, PhaenEx 2, No. 2 (fall/winter 2007): 1-23; Stopping the Anthropological Machine: Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, 2007)

In The Open, even while Agamben points to the shifting and unstable significations of the term “human,” he is more concerned with the ways in which we do and do not maintain the space in-between animal and human, the so-called missing link. The greatest danger of the anthropological machine is that, along with the categories human and animal, it produces a phantom third category in between the two, which both connects and separates them and thereby constitutes and sustains them. He concludes: What would thus be obtained, however, is neither an animal life nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and excluded from itself—only a bare life. And faced with this extreme figure of the human and the inhuman, it is not so much a matter of asking which of the two machines (or of the two variants of the same machine) is better or more effective—or, rather, less lethal and bloody—as it is of understanding how they work so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them. (37-8) A bare life is one produced by biological and medical science as a living body separated from its social, political and even ecological context. In Homo Sacer, Agamben suggests that it is an exceptional body (monstrous or sacred) whose fate can be determined outside of systems of law or reason (see Homo Sacer). As such, the deadly killing power it provokes seems virtually unstoppable. Thus, Agamben maintains that only by understanding how this logic works, which is to say, how the anthropological machine creates homo sapiens who are considered less than human, can we hope to stop it.

#### Dubbing people “anthropocentric” because they didn’t talk about animals is inaccurate and turns the critique

Lewis 92 **–** professor in the School of the Environment and the Center for International Studies at Duke University. Green Delusions, 1992 p17-18

Nature for Nature’s Sake—And Humanity for Humanity’s It is widely accepted that environmental thinkers can be divided into two camps: those who favor the preservation of nature for nature’s sake, and those who wish only to maintain the environment as the necessary habitat of humankind (see Pepper 1989; O’Riordan 1989; W Fox 1990). In the first group stand the green radicals, while the second supposedly consists of environmental reformers, also labeled “shallow ecologists.” Radicals often pull no punches in assailing the members of the latter camp for their anthropocentrism, managerialism, and gutless accommo­dationism—to some, “shallow ecology” is “just a more efficient form of exploitation and oppression” (quoted in Nash 1989:202). While this dichotomy may accurately depict some of the major approaches of the past, it is remarkably **unhelpful for devising the kind of framework required for a truly effective environmental movement**. It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-anthropocentric view (that is, one that accords intrinsic worth to nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs of radical environmentalism. Sim­ilarly, it portrays those who favor reforms within the political and economic structures of representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be aligned in such a manner. (For an instructive discussion of the pitfalls of the anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric dichotomy, see Nor­ton 1987, chapter ir.)

#### Anthropocentrism is inevitable, but strategic anthropomorphism is possible – we can identify with and make decisions for the benefit of other beings

**Scholtz, 5** – associate Professor in Law, North-West University, (“Animal Culling: A Sustainable Approach or Anthropocentric Atrocity?: Issues of Biodiversity and Custodial Sovereignty”, MqJICEL (2005) Vol 2)

The CBD recognizes that the value of the biosphere is integrated with the importance of conservation of the biosphere for human survival. Loss of biodiversity in nature may impact on man just as the actions of man impact on nature.49 The anthropocentric approach evoked responses from various scholars who have advocated that nature itself should be awarded subjective rights.5 In a previous publication the author introduced the so-called ‘qualitative approach’ in order to escape the dichotomy of subject (man) and object (nature). A holistic approach is needed whereby the two opposites are united in a single organism. Instead of arguing for or against an anthropocentric approach, one must favour and promote ‘quality’ of the organism as the goal which needs to be achieved.51 According to this viewpoint it is impossible to escape anthropocentrism. **Anthropocentrism is inevitable** even in the instance where human beings confer rights on natural objects. It is futile to engage in an approach which does not pay heed to this reality. The focus on quality reconciles the interests of both man and nature. Quality encompasses quality of life for man which requires quality of, for instance, the ecosystem of which humans are a part. The focus on quality provides one with a certain conceptual understanding of the relationship between man and the environment. The question which arises is whether the qualitative approach really addresses the criticism that sustainable development is anthropocentric and that the interests of nature may accordingly be disregarded in favour of human needs? The acknowledgement that one should focus on quality already manifests in the concept of diluted anthropocentrism. This diluted form of anthropocentrism may also be relevant for the notion of sustainable development. To illustrate this point one may refer to the precautionary approach which is one of the well-known principles of sustainable development. This approach requires that despite absence of scientific evidence that actions may harm the environment, protective and/or prohibitory measures must be taken. The broad scope of this approach implies that various factors must be taken into account. These may extend beyond human interests to include the interests of nature.52 This important principle or approach is indicative of the diluted anthropocentrism inherent in the ideal of sustainable development. If one also takes notice of intergenerational equity in addition to the precautionary approach sustainable development, then the line of reasoning is further strengthened as actions detrimental to nature may have negative effects on future generations. The quality of life of future generations may be diminished by a decrease in biodiversity through the actions of the present generation. The recognition of the qualitative approach may be of importance in decisionmaking in issues of sustainable development. Where a decision-maker needs to balance the three elements of sustainable development; namely ecological, developmental and societal needs; the qualitative approach implies that one does not change the values which need to be balanced. Rather, it is a case where the perceptions of the adjudicator are altered to accord with reality. This resulting decision would reflect the reality which does not support the ‘fiction’ that the human component can be disregarded as the ecocentric approach propounds. One of the presumptions on which the qualitative theory is built is that conservation and use can only be achieved from a homocentric approach and further, that alternative theories establish a fiction whereby the human adjudicator is disregarded by way of elimination. This does not reflect reality. For some commentators this presumption is unconvincing. For example, Gillespie contends that: … non-anthropocentric theorists are not claiming that it is possible to know exactly what it is to be a non-human piece of Nature, but only that it is still possible to make certain broad assumptions about the general interests of living entities. Without this ability, a male could not be non-sexist, or a Caucasian, non-racist.53 Gillespie’s viewpoint is not without merit, but does this mean that the qualitative approach is incorrect? That the human component in relation to environmental protection cannot be disregarded does not imply that humans cannot make decisions which are in the broad interests of biodiversity. By way of analogy, it would of course be absurd to state that a caucasian is incapable of being non-racist. These examples do not, however, suffice to explain the complex homocentric relationship between man and the environment. Caucasians may be non-racist, but in a society in which they dominate it is most probable that they may pursue their self-interest as a group in certain circumstances.54 This does not mean that the dominant group is unaware of the general interests of others, but rather pertains to the adjudication of interests. As such it is not a question of knowledge regarding the interest of other entities, but the issue pertains to the adjudication of interests. The examples provided by Gillespie furthermore differ from the situation between humans and nature. Objects of nature are incapable of voicing their concerns in the same way as humans. It is accordingly true that man may make certain assumptions regarding nature’s interests, but man will evaluate these interests from an anthropocentric perspective. The qualitative theory therefore attempts to ameliorate man’s selfinterest to accord with a more holistic approach in which the interests of man are more in line with the requirements of biodiversity, for instance.55 According to the qualitative approach, biodiversity needs to be conserved and used in a sustainable fashion because of its instrumental value. Biodiversity has a qualitative instrumental value which far exceeds the total of man’s self-interest. Self-interest, in this instance, presupposes a certain interest in non-human elements because of the linkage between man and environment.

### AT: Kochi & Ordan Alt

**Permutation solves their thought experiment**

**Kochi & Ordan, 8** \*Queen’s University AND \*\*Bar Ilan University, (Tarik & Noam, “An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity”, Borderlands VOLUME 7 NUMBER 3)

While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.